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We will strive increasingly to quicken the public sense of public duty;that
thus...we will transmit this city not only not less,but greater,better,and
more beautiful than it was transmitted to us.
—Oath of ofﬁce required of council members 
in the ancient city of Athens
Introduction: Local Government and Local
Governance
Local governmentrefers to speciﬁc institutions or entities created by
national constitutions (Brazil,Denmark,France,India,Italy,Japan,
Sweden), by state constitutions (Australia, the United States), by
ordinary legislation of a higher level of central government (New
Zealand, the United Kingdom, most countries), by provincial or
state legislation (Canada, Pakistan), or by executive order (China)
to deliver a range of speciﬁed services to a relatively small geo-
graphically delineated area. Local governance is a broader concept
and is deﬁned as the formulation and execution of collective action
at the local level. Thus, it encompasses the direct and indirect rolesof formal institutions of local government and government hierarchies, as
well as the roles ofinformal norms,networks,community organizations,and
neighborhood associations in pursuing collective action by deﬁning the
framework for citizen-citizen and citizen-state interactions,collective deci-
sion making,and delivery of local public services.
Local governance, therefore, includes the diverse objectives of vibrant,
living, working, and environmentally preserved self-governing communi-
ties.Good local governance is not just about providing a range of local ser-
vices but also about preserving the life and liberty of residents,creating space
for democratic participation and civic dialogue,supporting market-led and
environmentally sustainable local development, and facilitating outcomes
that enrich the quality of life of residents.
Although the concept of local governance is as old as the history of
humanity, only recently has it entered the broad discourse in the academic
and practice literature. Globalization and the information revolution are
forcing a reexamination of citizen-state relations and roles and the relation-
ships of various orders of government with entities beyond government—
and thereby an enhanced focus on local governance. The concept, however,
has yet to be embraced fully by the literature on development economics,
because of the longstanding tradition in the development assistance com-
munity offocusing on either local governments or community organizations
while neglecting the overall institutional environment that facilitates or
retards interconnectivity,cooperation,or competition among organizations,
groups,norms,and networks that serve public interest at the local level.
Several writers (Bailey 1999; Dollery and Wallis 2001; Rhodes 1997;
Stoker 1999) have recently argued that the presence of a vast network of enti-
ties beyond government that are engaged in local services delivery or qual-
ity of life issues makes it unrealistic to treat local government as a single
entity (see also Goss 2001).Analytical recognition of this broader concept of
local governance is critical to developing a framework for local governance
that is responsive (doing the right thing—delivering services that are con-
sistent with citizens’preferences or are citizen focused); responsible (doing
the right thing the right way—working better but costing less and bench-
marking with the best);and accountable (to citizens,through a rights-based
approach).Such analysis is important because the role of local government
in such a setting contrasts sharply with its traditional role.
This chapter traces the evolution and analytical underpinnings of local
governance as background to a better understanding of the case studies of
developing countries in this book. The next section outlines analytical
approaches to local governance that can be helpful in understanding the role
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It further develops a model oflocal governance that integrates various strands
of this literature. This model has important implications for evaluating and
reforming local governance in both industrial and developing countries.The
third section presents stylized models and institutions of local governance as
practiced in different parts of the world during past centuries. It compares
and contrasts the ancient Indian and Chinese systems of local governance
with Nordic, Southern European, North American, and Australian models.
The last section provides a comparative overview oflocal government organ-
ization and ﬁnance in selected developing countries as an introduction to the
in-depth treatment of these countries in the rest of the book.
The Theory: Conceptual Perspectives on Local Governance
and Central-Local Relations
Several accepted theories provide a strong rationale for decentralized deci-
sion making and a strong role for local governments, on the grounds of
efficiency,accountability,manageability,and autonomy.
 Stigler’s menu. Stigler (1957) identiﬁes two principles of jurisdictional
design:
— The closer a representative government is to the people, the better it
works.
— People should have the right to vote for the kind and amount of public
services they want.
These principles suggest that decision making should occur at the lowest
level of government consistent with the goal of allocative efﬁciency.Thus,
the optimal size of jurisdiction varies with speciﬁc instances of economies
of scale and beneﬁt-cost spillovers.
 The principle ofﬁscal equivalency.A related idea on the design ofjurisdictions
has emerged from the public choice literature.Olson (1969) argues that if
a political jurisdiction and beneﬁt area overlap, the free-rider problem is
overcome and the marginal beneﬁt equals the marginal cost ofproduction,
thereby ensuring optimal provision of public services.Equating thepolitical
jurisdiction with the beneﬁt area is called the principle ofﬁscal equivalency
and requires a separate jurisdiction for each public service.
 The correspondence principle.A related concept is proposed by Oates (1972):
the jurisdiction that determines the level of provision of each public good
should include precisely the set of individuals who consume the good.This
The New Vision of Local Governance 3principle generally requires a large number of overlapping jurisdictions.
Frey and Eichenberger (1995,1996,1999) have extended this idea to deﬁne
the concept offunctional,overlapping,and competing jurisdictions (FOCJ).
They argue that jurisdictions could be organized along functional lines while
overlapping geographically,and that individuals and communities could be
free to choose among competing jurisdictions. Individuals and communi-
ties express their preferences directly through initiatives and referenda.The
jurisdictions have authority over their members and the power to raise taxes
to fulﬁll their tasks.The school communities of the Swiss canton of Zurich
and special districts in North America follow the FOCJ concept.
 The decentralization theorem. According to this theorem, advanced by
Oates (1972,p.55),“each public service should be provided by the juris-
diction having control over the minimum geographic area that would
internalize beneﬁts and costs of such provision,”because
— local governments understand the concerns of local residents;
— local decision making is responsive to the people for whom the services
are intended, thus encouraging ﬁscal responsibility and efﬁciency,
especially if ﬁnancing of services is also decentralized;
— unnecessary layers of jurisdiction are eliminated;
— interjurisdictional competition and innovation are enhanced.
An ideal decentralized system ensures a level and combination of public
services consistent with voters’preferences while providing incentives for
the efﬁcient provision of such services.Some degree of central control or
compensatory grants may be warranted in the provision of services when
spatial externalities,economies of scale,and administrative and compli-
ance costs are taken into consideration.The practical implications of this
theorem,again,require a large number of overlapping jurisdictions.
 The subsidiarity principle.According to this principle,taxing,spending,and
regulatory functions should be exercised by lower levels of government
unless a convincing case can be made for assigning them to higher levels of
government.This principle evolved from the social teaching of the Roman
Catholic Church and was ﬁrst proposed by Pope Leo XIII in 1891. Subse-
quently,Pope Pius XI highlighted the principle ofsubsidiarity as a third way
between dictatorship and a laissez-faire approach to governance. The
Maastricht Treaty adopted it as a guiding principle for the assignment of
responsibilities among members of the European Union (EU).This prin-
ciple is the polar opposite of the residuality principle typically applied in a
unitary country, where local governments are assigned functions that the
central government is unwilling or thinks it is unable to perform.
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Achieving the optimal number and size of local jurisdictions requires the
operation of community formation processes and the redrawing of juris-
dictional boundaries.
 Voting with feet. According to Tiebout (1956), people consider tax costs
and the public services menu offered by a jurisdiction in deciding where
to live. Thus, voting with feet leads to the formation of jurisdictions,
creating a market analog for public service provision. Oates (1969)
argued that if people vote with their feet, ﬁscal differentials across com-
munities are capitalized into residential property values.This conclusion
has been refuted by formal tests of allocative efﬁciency proposed by
Brueckner (1982) and Shah (1988, 1989, 1992). Both tests suggest that
optimal provision of public services is not ensured by voting with feet
alone but depends also on rational voting behavior.
 Voting by ballot. This line of research suggests that collective decision
making may not ensure maximization of the electorate’s welfare,because
citizens and their governmental agents can have different goals.
 Voluntary associations. Buchanan (1965) postulates that the provision of
public services through voluntary associations of people (clubs) ensures
the formation of jurisdictions consistent with the optimal provision of
public services.
 Jurisdictional redesign. An important process for community formation
in modern societies is redrawing the boundaries of existing jurisdictions
to create special or multipurpose jurisdictions.
Roles and Responsibilities of Local Governments: Analytical
Underpinnings
There are five perspectives on models of government and the roles and
responsibilities of local government: (a) traditional fiscal federalism, (b)
new public management (NPM), (c) public choice, (d) new institutional
economics (NIE), and (e) network forms of local governance. The feder-
alism and the NPM perspectives are concerned primarily with market
failures and how to deliver public goods efficiently and equitably. The
public choice and NIE perspectives are concerned with government
failures. The network forms of governance perspective is concerned with
institutional arrangements to overcome both market and government
failures.
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Traditional ﬁscal federalism perspectives
The ﬁscal federalism approach treats local government as a subordinate tier
in a multitiered system and outlines principles for deﬁning the roles and
responsibilities of orders of government (see Shah 1994 for such a frame-
work for the design of ﬁscal constitutions). Hence, one sees that in most
federations,as in Canada and the United States,local governments are exten-
sions of state governments (dual federalism). In a few isolated instances, as
in Brazil,they are equal partners with higher-level governments (cooperative
federalism),and in an exceptional case,Switzerland,they are the main source
of sovereignty and have greater constitutional signiﬁcance than the federal
government.Thus,depending on the constitutional and legal status of local
governments,state governments in federal countries assume varying degrees
of oversight of the provision of local public services. In a unitary state,
subnational governments act on behalf of the central government. There-
fore,a useful set of guidelines for the assignment of responsibilities for local
public services in a unitary state would be the following:
 Policy development and standards of service and performance are deter-
mined at the national level.
 Implementation oversight is carried out at the state or provincial level.
 Services are provided by the local governments or by the metropolitan or
regional governments.
In all countries, the production of services can be public or private, at
the discretion of local or regional governments. Responsibilities for public
services other than such purely local ones as ﬁre protection could be shared,
using these guidelines.
The assignment of public services to local governments or to metropol-
itan or regional governments can be based on considerations such as
economies of scale,economies of scope (appropriate bundling of local pub-
lic services to improve efﬁciency through information and coordination
economies and enhanced accountability through voter participation and
cost recovery) and cost-beneﬁt spillovers, proximity to beneﬁciaries, con-
sumer preferences,and budgetary choices about the composition of spending.
The particular level of government to which a service is assigned determines
the public or private production of the service in accordance with considera-
tions of efﬁciency and equity. Large metropolitan areas with populations in
excess of1 million could be considered for subdivision into a ﬁrst tier ofmunic-
ipal governments of smaller size responsible for neighborhood-type services
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vices.The ﬁrst-tier governments could be directly elected,and elected mayors
of these governments could form the metropolitan council at the second tier.
Two-tier structures for metropolitan governance have been practiced in
Melbourne,Australia;Vancouver,Canada;Allegheny county,Pennsylvania,
United States; and Stockholm,Sweden.
In industrial countries, special-purpose agencies or bodies deliver a
wide range of metropolitan and regional public services, including educa-
tion,health,planning,recreation,and environmental protection.Such bod-
ies can include library boards; transit and police commissions; and utilities
providing water,gas,and electricity.These agencies deal with public services
whose delivery areas transcend political jurisdictions and are better ﬁnanced
by loans,user charges,and earmarked beneﬁt taxes,such as a supplementary
mill rate on a property tax base to ﬁnance a local school board. If kept to a
minimum, such agencies help fully exploit economies of scale in the deliv-
ery of services where political boundaries are not consistent with service
areas. A proliferation of these agencies can undermine accountability and
budgetary ﬂexibility at local levels.Accountability and responsiveness to vot-
ers are weakened if members of special-purpose bodies are appointed rather
than elected.Budgetary ﬂexibility is diminished if a majority of local expen-
ditures fall outside the control of local councils.
Table 1.1 presents a matrix for a normative assignment of spending
responsibilities among different orders of government.Table 1.2 provides a
subjective assessment of how various allocative criteria favor local or met-
ropolitan assignment and whether public or private production is favored
for efﬁciency or equity. The criteria and the assessment presented in this
table are arbitrary; practical and institutional considerations should be
applied to this analysis,and the reader may well reach different conclusions
using the same criteria.
Private sector participation can also take a variety of forms, including
contracting through competitive biddings,franchise operations (local gov-
ernment acting as a regulatory agency),grants (usually for recreational and
cultural activities),vouchers (redeemable by local government with private
providers), volunteers (mostly in ﬁre stations and hospitals), community
self-help activities (for crime prevention), and private nonproﬁt organiza-
tions (for social services).Thus,a mix of delivery systems is appropriate for
local public services. In most developing countries, the ﬁnancial capacities
of local governments are quite limited.Fostering private sector participation
in the delivery of local public services thus assumes greater signiﬁcance.Such
participation enhances accountability and choice in the local public sector.
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TABLE 1.1 Representative Assignment of Expenditure Responsibilities
Policy, standards, Provision and  Production and 
Function and oversight administration distribution Comments
Interregional and international conﬂicts 
resolution U U N,P Beneﬁts and costs international in scope
External trade U U,N,S P Beneﬁts and costs international in scope
Telecommunications U, N P P Has national and global dimensions
Financial transactions U,N P P Has national and global dimensions
Environment U,N,S,L U,N,S,L N,S,L,P Externalities of global, national, state,
and local scope
Foreign direct investment N,L L P Local infrastructure critical
Defense N N N,P Beneﬁts and costs national in scope
Foreign affairs N N N Beneﬁts and costs national in scope
Monetary policy, currency, and banking U, ICB ICB ICB, P Independence from all levels essential;
some international role for common
discipline
Interstate commerce Constitution, N N P Constitutional safeguards important for
factors and goods mobilityT
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Immigration U,N N N U because of forced exit
Transfer payments N N N Redistribution
Criminal and civil law N N N Rule of law, a national concern
Industrial policy N N P Intended to prevent “beggar thy
neighbor” policies
Regulation N N,S,L N,S,L,P Internal common market
Fiscal policy N N,S,L N,S,L,P Coordination possible
Natural resources N N,S,L N,S,L,P Promotes regional equity and internal
common market
Education, health, and social welfare N,S,L S,L S,L,P Transfers in kind
Highways N,S,L N,S,L S,L,P Beneﬁts and costs vary in scope
Parks and recreation N,S,L N,S,L N,S,L,P Beneﬁts and costs vary in scope
Police S, L S,L S,L Primarily local beneﬁts
Water, sewer, refuse, and ﬁre protection L L L,P Primarily local beneﬁts
Source: Shah 1994, 2004.
Note: U = supranational responsibility, ICB = independent central bank, N = national government, S = state or provincial government, L = local government, P = nongovernmental
sectors or civil society. 1
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TABLE 1.2 Assignment of Local Public Services to Municipal and Regional or Metropolitan Governments 
Allocation criteria for provision
Economic Allocation criteria for public
evaluation of vs. private production
Economies Economies Beneﬁt-cost Political  Consumer  sectoral
Public service of scale of scope spillover proximity sovereignty choices Composite Efﬁciency Equity Composite
Fireﬁghting L L L L L M L P G P
Police protection L L L L L M L P G G
Refuse collection L L L L L M L P P P
Neighborhood parks L L L L L M L P G G
Street maintenance L L L L L M L P P P
Trafﬁc management L M L L L M L P P P
Local transit service L M L L L M L P P P
Local libraries L L L L L M L G G G
Primary education L L M M L M M P G P,G
Secondary education L L M M L M M P G P,G
Public transportation M M M L,M M M M P,G G P,G
Water supply M M M L,M M M M P G P,G
Sewage disposal M M M M M M M P,G P,G P,G
Refuse disposal M M M M M M M P P P
Public health M M M M M M M G G G
Hospitals M M M M M M M P,G G P,G
Electric power M M M M M M M P P P
Air and water pollution M M M M M M M G G G
Special police M M M M M M M G G G
Regional parks M M M L,M M M M G G G
Regional planning M M M L,M M M M G G G
Source: Shah 1994.
Note: L = local government, M = regional or metropolitan government, P = private sector, G = public sector.However, assigning responsibility for the provision of service to a speciﬁc
level of government does not imply that government should be directly
engaged in its production.Limited empirical evidence suggests that private
production of some services promotes efﬁciency and equity.
Fiscal federalism literature also provides guidance on ﬁnancing choices
for local governments. Four general principles require consideration in
assigning taxing powers to various governments. First, the economic efﬁ-
ciency criterion dictates that taxes on mobile factors and tradable goods that
have a bearing on the efﬁciency of the internal common market should be
assigned to the center. Subnational assignment of taxes on mobile factors
may facilitate the use of socially wasteful “beggar thy neighbor” policies to
attract resources to own areas by regional and local governments.In a glob-
alized world,even central assignment of taxes on mobile capital may not be
very effective in the presence of tax havens and the difﬁculty of tracing and
attributing incomes from virtual transactions to various physical spaces.
Second, national equity considerations warrant that progressive redistribu-
tive taxes should be assigned to the center, which limits the possibility of
regional and local governments following perverse redistribution policies
using both taxes and transfers to attract high-income people and repel low-
income ones. Doing so, however, leaves open the possibility of supplemen-
tary,ﬂat-rate,local charges on residence-based national income taxes.Third,
the administrative feasibility criterion (lowering compliance and adminis-
tration costs) suggests that taxes should be assigned to the jurisdiction with
the best ability to monitor relevant assessments. This criterion minimizes
administrative costs as well as the potential for tax evasion. For example,
property, land, and betterment taxes are good candidates for local assign-
ment because local governments are in a better position to assess the mar-
ket values of such assets.Fourth,the ﬁscal need orrevenue adequacy criterion
suggests that to ensure accountability, revenue means (the ability to raise
revenues from own sources) should be matched as closely as possible with
expenditure needs (see table 1.3 for a representative assignment of taxing
responsibilities).The literature also argues that long-lived assets should pri-
marily be ﬁnanced by raising debt,so as to ensure equitable burden sharing
across generations (Inman 2005). Furthermore, such large and lumpy
investments typically cannot be ﬁnanced by current revenues and reserves
alone (see box 1.1).
These four principles suggest that user charges are suitable for use by all
orders of government,but the case for decentralizing taxing powers is not as
compelling as that for decentralizing public service delivery.This is because
lower-level taxes can introduce inefﬁciencies in the allocation of resources
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TABLE 1.3 A Representative Assignment of Taxing Powers
Determination Determination Collection  and 
Types of tax of base of rate administration Comments
Customs F F F International trade taxes
Corporate income tax F,U F,U F,U Mobile factor, stabilization tool
Resource taxes 
Resource rent (proﬁts and income) tax F F F High, unequally distributed tax bases
Royalties, fees, charges; severance 
taxes; and production, output, and 
property taxes S,L S,L S,L Beneﬁt taxes and charges for state-local services
Conservation charges S,L S,L S,L Intended to preserve local environment
Personal income tax F F,S,L F Redistributive, mobile factor, stabilization tool
Wealth taxes (taxes on capital, wealth, 
wealth transfers, inheritances, and 
bequests) F F,S F Redistributive
Payroll tax F,S F,S F,S Beneﬁt charge, such as social security coverage
Multistage sales taxes (value added tax) F F F Border tax adjustments possible under federal
assignment; potential stabilization tool
Single-stage sales taxes (manufacturer, 
wholesale, and retail)
Option A S S,L S,L Higher compliance cost
Option B F S F Harmonized, lower compliance costT
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“Sin” taxes
Excises on alcohol and tobacco F,S F,S F,S Health care a shared responsibility
Betting and gambling taxes S,L S,L S,L State and local responsibility
Lotteries S,L S,L S,L State and local responsibility
Racetrack taxes S,L S,L S,L State and local responsibility
Taxation of “bads”
Carbon tax F F F Intended to combat global or national pollution
Energy taxes F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L Pollution impact may be national, regional, or local
Motor fuels tolls F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L Tolls on federal, provincial, and local roads
Efﬂuent charges F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L Intended to deal with interstate, intermunicipal,
or local pollution issues
Congestion tolls F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L Tolls on federal, provincial, and local roads
Parking fees L L L Intended to control local congestion
Motor vehicles
Registration, transfer taxes,  
and annual fees S S S State responsibility
Driver’s licenses and fees S S S State responsibility
Business taxes S S S Beneﬁt tax
Excises S,L S,L S,L Residence-based taxes
Property tax S L L Completely immobile factor, beneﬁt tax
Land tax S L L Completely immobile factor, beneﬁt tax
Frontage and betterment taxes S,L L L Cost recovery
Poll tax F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L Payment for local services
User charges F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L Payment for services received
Source: Shah 1994.
Note: U = supranational agency, F = federal, S = state or province, L = municipal or local government.across the federation and cause inequities among people in different juris-
dictions. In addition, collection and compliance costs can increase signiﬁ-
cantly. These problems are more severe for some taxes than others, so the
selection of which taxes to decentralize must be made with care, balancing
the need to achieve ﬁscal and political accountability at the lower levels of
government against the disadvantages of having a fragmented tax system.
The tradeoff between increased accountability and increased economic costs
from decentralizing taxing responsibilities can be mitigated by ﬁscal
arrangements that permit joint occupation and harmonization of taxes to
overcome fragmentation and by ﬁscal equalization transfers that will reduce
the ﬁscal inefﬁciencies and inequities that arise from different ﬁscal capaci-
ties across regional and local governments (see table 1.4 on the design of ﬁs-
cal transfers).
The ﬁscal federalism perspectives presented above are helpful, but in
practice they have resulted in some major difﬁculties—especially in devel-
oping countries—because the practice seems to emphasize ﬁscal federalism’s
structures and processes as ends rather than as means to an end.These struc-
tures and processes were designed as a response to market failures and het-
erogeneous preferences with little recognition of government failures or the
role of entities beyond government. The NPM and the NIE literature (syn-
thesized in the following paragraphs) sheds further light on the origins of
these difﬁculties. This literature highlights the sources of government fail-
ures and their implications for the role of local government.
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The ﬁscal federalism literature argues for local assignment of the following
taxes and charges in addition to debt ﬁnance for long-lived assets: user
charges; property and land taxes; frontage and betterment taxes and charges;
poll taxes and charges; single-stage (retail) sales taxes; piggyback ﬂat tax on
residence-based national income taxes; duties on hotel rooms, airport use,
entertainment, taxis, and rental cars; vehicle registration fees; single business
or profession permits; resource royalties; severance taxes; local conservation
charges; taxes on local “bads” (BTU taxes, congestion tolls, parking fees, and
efﬂuent charges); and “sin” taxes (taxes on betting, gambling, lotteries, race-
tracks).
Source: Author.
BOX 1.1 Local and Metropolitan Finance: Options for Own-Source
RevenuesThe New Vision of Local Governance 15
TABLE 1.4 Principles and Better Practices in Grant Design
Grant objective Grant design Better practices Practices to avoid
Bridge ﬁscal gap Reassignment of Tax abatement in Deﬁcit grants; 
responsibilities, Canada  and tax-by-tax  sharing 
tax abatement, or  tax-base sharing 
tax-base sharing in Brazil, Canada,
and Pakistan
Reduce regional ﬁscal General  Fiscal equalization  General revenue
disparities nonmatching programs ofCanada sharing with 
ﬁscal capacity and Germany multiple factors
equalization  
transfers
Compensate for beneﬁt Open-ended  Grant for teaching 
spillovers matching hospitals in
transfers with  South Africa
matching
rate consistent 
with spillover
of beneﬁts
Set national minimum Nonmatching block Roads and primary Transfers with
standards transfers with  education grants,  conditions on
conditions as in Indonesia  spending alone; 
on standards of (now defunct);  ad hoc grants
service and access education 
transfers, as in  
Colombia and Chile;
health transfers in 
Brazil and Canada
Inﬂuence local priorities  Open-ended  Matching transfers  Ad hoc grants
in areas of high national  matching for social 
but low local priority transfers  assistance
(preferably with
matching rate to 
vary inversely 
with ﬁscal capacity)
Provide stabilization Capital grants with Limited use of Stabilization 
maintenance  capital grants and grants with
possible encouragement  no  future 
of private sector  upkeep
participation by requirements
providing political 
and policy
risk guarantee
Source: Shah 1994, 2004.Local government as an independent facilitator of creating public value:
New public management perspectives 
Two interrelated criteria have emerged from the NPM literature in recent
years determining,ﬁrst,what local governments should do and,second,how
they should do it better.
In discussing the ﬁrst criterion,the literature assumes that citizens are the
principals but have multiple roles as governors (owner-authorizers, voters,
taxpayers, community members); activist-producers (providers of services,
coproducers,self-helpers obliging others to act); and consumers (clients and
beneﬁciaries) (see Moore 1996).In this context,signiﬁcant emphasis is placed
on the government as an agent of the people to serve public interest and cre-
ate public value. Moore (1996) deﬁnes public value as measurable improve-
ments in social outcomes or quality of life.This concept is directly relevant to
local and municipal services,for which it is feasible to measure such improve-
ments and have some sense of attribution.The concept is useful in evaluating
conﬂicting and perplexing choices in the use of local resources. The concept
is also helpful in deﬁning the role ofgovernment,especially local governments.
It frames the debate between those who argue that the public sector crowds
out private sector investments and those who argue that the public sector cre-
ates an enabling environment for the private sector to succeed,in addition to
providing basic municipal and social services.
Moore (1996) has argued that,rather than diverting resources from the
private sector,local governments use some of the resources that come as free
goods—namely, resources of consent, goodwill, Good Samaritan values,
community spirit,compliance,and collective public action.This argument
suggests that the role of public managers in local governments is to tap these
free resources and push the frontiers of improved social outcomes beyond
what may be possible with meager local revenues. Thus, public managers
create value by mobilizing and facilitating a network of providers beyond
local government. Democratic accountability ensures that managerial
choices about creating public value are based on broader consensus by local
residents (see Goss 2001).Thus,the local public sector continuously strives
to respect citizen preferences and to be accountable to them. This environ-
ment,focused on creating public value,encourages innovation and experi-
mentation, bounded by the risk tolerance of the median voter in each
community.
The main current of the NPM literature is concerned not with what to
do but with how to do it better. It argues for an incentive environment in
which managers are given ﬂexibility in the use of resources but held account-
able for results.Top-down controls are thus replaced by a bottom-up focus
16 Anwar Shah with Sana Shahon results. Two NPM models have been implemented in recent years. The
ﬁrst model is focused on making managers manage. In New Zealand, this
goal is accomplished through new contractualism,whereby public managers
are bound by formal contracts for service delivery but have ﬂexibility in
resource allocation and choice of public or private providers. Malaysia
attempts to achieve the same through client charters, under which public
managers are evaluated for their attainment of speciﬁed service standards
(Shah 2005).
The second model creates incentives to let managers manage.It applies
the new managerialism approach,as used in Australia and the United States,
whereby government performance in service delivery and social outcomes
is monitored,but there are no formal contracts,and accountability is guided
by informal agreements. In China and the United Kingdom, autonomous
agency models are used for performance accountability. Canada uses an
alternative service delivery framework: public managers are encouraged to
facilitate a network of service providers and to use benchmarking to achieve
the most effective use of public monies. The emerging focus on client ori-
entation and results-based accountability is encouraging local governments
to innovate in many parts of the world (Caulﬁeld 2003).
Local government as an institution to advance self-interest: The public
choice approach
Bailey (1999) has conceptualized four models of local government:
 A local government that assumes it knows best and acts to maximize the
welfare of its residents conforms to the benevolent despot model.
 A local government that provides services consistent with local residents’
willingness to pay conforms to the ﬁscal exchange model.
 A local government that focuses on public service provision to advance
social objectives conforms to the ﬁscal transfer model.
 A local government that is captured by self-interested bureaucrats and
politicians conforms to the leviathanmodel,which is consistent with the
public choice perspectives.
In the same tradition,Breton (1995) provides a comprehensive typology
of models of government.He distinguishes two broad types of government.
The ﬁrst embodies the doctrine of the common good,and the second acts to
preserve the self-interest of the governing elites.The second type can assume
either a monolithic or a composite structure.In a monolithic structure,local
government is subject to capture by bureaucrats or interestgroups.Also,local
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(as in the leviathan model) or may advance compulsion or coercion. If the
self-interest model assumes a composite structure, it may encourage
Tiebout-type competition among local governments.
The public choice literature endorses the self-interest doctrine of gov-
ernment and argues that various stakeholders involved in policy formula-
tion and implementation are expected to use opportunities and resources to
advance their self-interest. This view has important implications for the
design of local government institutions.For local governments to serve the
interests of people, they must have complete local autonomy in taxing and
spending and they must be subject to competition within and beyond gov-
ernment. In the absence of these prerequisites, local governments will be
inefﬁcient and unresponsive to citizen preferences (Boyne 1998). Bailey
(1999) advocates strengthening exit and voice mechanisms in local gover-
nance to overcome government failures associated with the self-interest doc-
trine of public choice. He suggests that easing supply-side constraints for
public services through wider competition will enhance choice and promote
exit options and that direct democracy provisions will strengthen voice (see
also Dollery and Wallis 2001).The NIE approach discussed below draws on
the implications of opportunistic behavior by government agents for the
transaction costs to citizens as principals.
The government as a runaway train: NIE concerns with the institutions of
public governance
The NIE provides a framework for analyzing ﬁscal systems and local
empowerment and for comparing mechanisms for local governance. This
framework is helpful in designing multiple orders of government and in
clarifying local government responsibilities in a broader framework of local
governance. According to the NIE framework, various orders of govern-
ments (as agents) are created to serve the interests of the citizens as princi-
pals. The jurisdictional design should ensure that these agents serve the
public interest while minimizing transaction costs for the principals.
The existing institutional framework does not permit such optimiza-
tion,because the principals have bounded rationality;that is,they make the
best choices on the basis of the information at hand but are ill informed
about government operations. Enlarging the sphere of their knowledge
entails high transaction costs,which citizens are not willing to incur.Those
costs include participation and monitoring costs,legislative costs,executive
decision-making costs,agency costs or costs incurred to induce compliance
by agents with the compact,and uncertainty costs associated with unstable
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pals are,but they have an incentive to withhold information and to indulge
in opportunistic behaviors or “self-interest seeking with guile”(Williamson
1985, p. 7). Thus, the principals have only incomplete contracts with their
agents. Such an environment fosters commitment problems because the
agents may not follow the compact.
The situation is further complicated by three factors—weak or extant
countervailing institutions, path dependency, and the interdependency of
various actions. Countervailing institutions such as the judiciary, police,
parliament, and citizen activist groups are usually weak and unable to
restrain rent-seeking by politicians and bureaucrats.Historical and cultural
factors and mental models by which people see little beneﬁts to and high
costs of activism prevent corrective action.Further empowering local coun-
cils to take action on behalf of citizens often leads to loss of agency between
voters and councils, because council members may interfere in executive
decision making or may get co-opted in such operations while shirking their
legislative responsibilities.The NIE framework stresses the need to use var-
ious elements of transaction costs in designing jurisdictions for various ser-
vices and in evaluating choices between competing governance mechanisms.
Local government as a facilitator of network forms of local governance
The NIE approach provides an evaluation framework for alternative forms
and mechanisms of local governance. It speciﬁcally provides guidance in
dealing with government failures in a hierarchical form of public gover-
nance. The framework is also suitable for examining local government
involvement in a partnership of multiple organizations. Dollery and Wallis
(2001) extend the NIE approach to these issues.They argue that a structure
of resource dependency vitiates against collective action in the interest of the
common good because of the tragedy of commons associated with common
pool resources. This scenario results in failures in horizontal coordination
in a multiorganization partnership.
One possible solution is to introduce a market mechanism of gover-
nance,whereby a contract management agency enters into binding contracts
with all partners. However, this solution is unworkable because the poten-
tial number of contingencies may simply be too large to be covered by such
contracts.A second approach to overcome horizontal coordination,the so-
called hierarchical mechanism of governance, relies on institutional
arrangements to clarify roles and responsibilities and to establish mecha-
nisms for consultation, cooperation, and coordination, as is done in some
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costs and are subject to a high degree of failure attributable to the conﬂict-
ing interests of partners.
Given the high transaction costs and perceived infeasibility of market
and hierarchical mechanisms of governance for partnerships of multiple
organizations,a network mechanism of governance has been advanced as a
possible mode of governance for such partnerships—the kind to be man-
aged by local governments.The network form of governance relies on trust,
loyalty, and reciprocity between partners with no formal institutional safe-
guards. Networks formed on the basis of shared interests (interest-based
networks) can provide a stable form of governance if membership is limited
to partners that can make signiﬁcant resource contributions and if there is
a balance of powers among members. Members of such networks interact
frequently and see cooperation in one area as contingent on cooperation in
other areas.Repeated interaction among members builds trust.Hope-based
networks are built on the shared sentiments and emotions of members.
Members have shared beliefs in the worth and philosophy of the network
goals and have the passion and commitment to achieve those goals.The sta-
bility of such networks is highly dependent on the commitment and style of
their leadership (Dollery and Wallis 2001).
Local government has an opportunity to play a catalytic role in facilitat-
ing the roles of both interest-based and hope-based networks in improving
social outcomes for local residents.To play such a role,local government must
develop a strategic vision of how such partnerships can be formed and sus-
tained. But then the local government requires a new local public manage-
ment paradigm. Such a paradigm demands local government to separate
policy advice from program implementation,assuming a role as a purchaser
ofpublic services but not necessarily as a provider ofthem.Local government
may have to outsource services with higher provision costs and subject in-
house providers to competitive pressures from outside providers to lower
transaction costs for citizens. It also must actively seek the engagement of
both interest-based and hope-based networks to supplant local services. It
needs to develop the capacity to play a mediating role among various groups.
A synthesis: Toward a framework for responsive, responsible, and
accountable local governance
We have reviewed ideas emerging from the literature on political science,
economics,public administration,law,federalism,and the NIE with a view
to developing an integrated analytical framework for the comparative analy-
sis of local government and local governance institutions.
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accountability framework faced by various orders of government is not con-
ducive to a focus on service delivery consistent with citizen preferences.As
a result, corruption, waste, and inefﬁciencies permeate public governance.
Top-down hierarchical controls are ineffective; there is little accountability
because citizens are not empowered to hold governments accountable.
Fiscal federalism practices around the world are focused on structures
and processes, with little regard for outputs and outcomes. These practices
support top-down structures with preeminent federal legislation (that is,
federal legislation overrides any subnational legislation). The central gov-
ernment is at the apex,exercising direct control and micromanaging the sys-
tem.Hierarchical controls exercised by various layers of government have an
internal rule-based focus with little concern for their mandates. Govern-
ment competencies are determined on the basis of technical and adminis-
trative capacity, with almost no regard for client orientation, bottom-up
accountability,and lowering of transaction costs for citizens.Various orders
of government indulge in uncooperative zero-sum games for control.
This tug of war leads to large swings in the balance of powers. Shared
rule is a source of much confusion and conﬂict,especially in federal systems.
Local governments are typically handmaidens of states or provinces and
given straitjacket mandates. They are given only limited home rule in their
competencies. In short, local governments in this system of “federalism for
the governments,by the governments,and of the governments”get crushed
under a regime of intrusive controls by higher levels of governments. Citi-
zens also have limited voice and exit options.
The governance implications of such a system are quite obvious.Vari-
ous orders of government suffer from agency problems associated with
incomplete contracts and undeﬁned property rights, as the assignment of
taxing,spending,and regulatory powers remains to be clariﬁed—especially
in areas of shared rule.Intergovernmental bargaining leads to high transac-
tion costs for citizens. Universalism and pork-barrel politics result in a
tragedy of commons, as various orders of government compete to claim a
higher share of common pool resources. Under this system of governance,
citizens are treated as agents rather than as principals.
On how to reverse this trend and make governments responsive and
accountable to citizens,the dominant themes emphasized in the literature are
the subsidiarity principle, the principle of ﬁscal equivalency, the creation of
public value, results-based accountability, and the minimization of transac-
tion costs for citizens,as discussed earlier.These themes are useful but should
be integrated into a broader framework of citizen-centered governance, to
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a public sector focus on service delivery and bottom-up accountability.Such
integration is expected to deal with the commitment problem in various
levels of government by empowering citizens and by limiting their agents’
ability to indulge in opportunistic behavior.
citizen-centered local governance. Reforming the
institutions of local governance requires agreement on basic principles.
Three basic principles are advanced to initiate such a discussion:
 Responsive governance. This principle aims for governments to do the
right things—that is, to deliver services consistent with citizen prefer-
ences.
 Responsible governance. The government should also do it right—that is,
manage its ﬁscal resources prudently.It should earn the trust of residents
by working better and costing less and by managing ﬁscal and social risks
for the community. It should strive to improve the quality and quantity
of and access to public services. To do so, it needs to benchmark its
performance with the best-performing local government.
 Accountable governance.A local government should be accountable to its
electorate. It should adhere to appropriate safeguards to ensure that it
serves the public interest with integrity. Legal and institutional reforms
may be needed to enable local governments to deal with accountability
between elections—reforms such as a citizen’s charter and a provision for
recall of public ofﬁcials.
A framework of local governance that embodies these principles is
called citizen-centered governance (Andrews and Shah 2005). The distin-
guishing features of citizen-centered governance are the following:
 Citizen empowerment through a rights-based approach (direct democ-
racy provisions,citizens’charter);
 Bottom-up accountability for results;
 Evaluation of government performance as the facilitator of a network of
providers by citizens as governors, taxpayers, and consumers of public
services.
The framework emphasizes reforms that strengthen the role of citizens
as the principals and create incentives for government agents to comply with
their mandates (table 1.5).
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TABLE 1.5 Key Elements of Citizen-Centered Governance
Responsive governance Responsible governance Accountable governance
Has subsidiarity and home
rule
Has direct democracy
provisions
Has budget priorities
consistent with citizens’
preferences
Speciﬁes and meets
standards for access to
local services
Improves social outcomes
Offers security of life and
property
Offers shelter and food for
all
Has clean air, safe water,
and sanitation
Has a noise-free and pre-
served environment
Offers ease of commute
and pothole-free roads
Has primary school at a
walking distance
Has acceptable ﬁre and
ambulance response
times
Has libraries and Internet
access
Has park and recreation
programs and facilities
Follows due process:
 The principle of ultra
vires or general compe-
tence or community
governance
 The procedure bylaw
 Local master plans and
budgets
 Zoning bylaws and
regulations
 Funded mandates
Is ﬁscally prudent:
 Operating budget in
balance
 Golden rule for borrowing
 New capital projects that
specify upkeep costs and
how debt is to be repaid
 Conservative ﬁscal rules
to ensure sustainable
debt levels
 Major capital projects that
are subject to referenda
 Maintenance of positive
net worth 
 Commercially audited
ﬁnancial statements
Earns trust:
 Professionalism and
integrity of staff
 Safeguards against
malfeasance
 Streamlined processes
and e-governance
 Complaints and
feedback acted on
 Honest and fair tax
administration
 Strict compliance with
service standards
 Citizen-friendly output
budgets and service deliv-
ery performance reports
Lets the sunshine in: 
 Local government bylaw
on citizens’ right to
know
 Budgetary proposals and
annual performance
reports posted on the
Internet
 All decisions, including
the costs of concessions,
posted on the Internet
 Value for money
performance audits by
independent think tanks
 Open information and
public assessment
Works to strengthen citizen
voice and exit:
 Citizens’ charter
 Service standards
 Requirements for
citizens’ voice and
choice
 Sunshine rights
 Sunset clauses on
government programs
 Equity- and output-based
intergovernmental
ﬁnance
 Citizen-oriented
performance (output)
budgeting
 Service delivery outputs
and costs
 Citizens’ report card on
service delivery
performance
 Budget, contracts, and
performance reports
defended at open town
hall meetings
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 Participatory budgeting
and planning
Works better and costs less:
 All tasks subjected to alter-
native service delivery
test—that is, competitive
provision involving govern-
ment providers and enti-
ties beyond government 
 Financing that creates
incentives for competi-
tion and innovation
 Comparative evaluation
of service providers
 Public sector as a
purchaser through
performance contracts
but not necessarily a
provider of services
 Managerial ﬂexibility, but
accountability for results
 No lifelong or rotating
appointments
 Task specialization 
 Budgetary allocation
and output-based
performance contracts 
 Activity-based costing 
 Charges for capital use
 Accrual accounting 
 Benchmarking with the best
 General administration
costs subjected to public
scrutiny
 Boundaries that balance
beneﬁts and costs of
scale and scope
economies, externalities,
and decision making
 Boundaries consistent
with ﬁscal sustainability
 All documents subjected
to citizen-friendly
requirements
 Open processes for
contract bids
 Mandatory referenda on
large projects
 Steps taken so that at
least 50 percent of
eligible voters vote
 Citizens’ boards to
provide scorecard and
feedback on service
delivery performance
 Provisions for popular
initiatives and recall of
public ofﬁcials
 Bylaw on taxpayer rights
TABLE 1.5 Key Elements of Citizen-Centered Governance (continued)
Responsive governance Responsible governance Accountable governance
Source: Author’s views.The commitment problem may be mitigated by creatingcitizen-centered
local governance—by having direct democracy provisions, introducing
governing for results in government operations,and reforming the structure
of governance, thus shifting decision making closer to the people. Direct
democracy provisions require referenda on major issues and large projects
and require that citizens have the right to veto any legislation or government
program. A “governing for results” framework requires government
accountability to citizens for service delivery performance. Hence, citizens
have a charter deﬁning their basic rights as well as their rights of access to
speciﬁc standards of public services. Output-based intergovernmental
transfers strengthen compliance with such standards and strengthen
accountability and citizen empowerment (Shah 2006b).
Implications for division of powers within nations: Role reversals for
central and local governments
The framework described above has important implications for reforming
the structure of government. Top-down mandates on local governance will
need to be replaced by bottom-up compacts. Furthermore, the role of local
government must be expanded to serve as a catalyst for the formulation,
development,and operation of a network of both government providers and
entities beyond government.Local government’s traditionally acknowledged
technical capacity becomes less relevant in this framework.More important
are its institutional strengths as a purchaser of services and as a facilitator of
alliances, partnerships, associations, clubs, and networks for developing
social capital and improving social outcomes. Two distinct options are
possible in this regard,and both imply a pivotal role for local governments in
the intergovernmental system. The options are (a) local government as the
primary agent, subcontracting to local, state, and federal or central govern-
ment authorities and engaging networks and entities beyond government,
and (b) local,state,and national governments as independent agents.
option a: local governments as primary agents
of citizens.In this role,a local government serves as (a) a purchaser
of local services, (b) a facilitator of networks of government providers and
entities beyond government,and (c) a gatekeeper and overseer of state and
national governments for the shared rule or responsibilities delegated to
them.This role represents a fundamental shift in the division of powers from
higher to local governments. It has important constitutional implications.
Residual functions reside with local governments. State governments
perform intermunicipal services. The national government is assigned
The New Vision of Local Governance 25redistributive, security, foreign relations, and interstate functions such as
harmonization and consensus on a common framework. The Swiss system
bears close afﬁnity to this model.
option b: various orders of government as inde-
pendent agents. An alternative framework for establishing the
supremacy of the principals is to clarify the responsibilities and functions
of various orders as independent agents. This framework limits shared
rule. Finance follows function strictly, and fiscal arrangements are peri-
odically reviewed for fine-tuning. Local governments enjoy home rule,
with complete tax and expenditure autonomy.The Brazilian fiscal consti-
tution incorporates some features of this model, albeit with significant
deviations.
feasibility of options.Option A is well grounded in the his-
tory of modern governments and is most suited for countries with no 
history of internal or external conﬂict in recent times.It is already practiced
in Switzerland.War, conquest, and security concerns have led to a reversal
of the roles of various orders of governments and to a reduction in local
government functions in more recent history.Globalization and the infor-
mation revolution have already brought pressures for much larger and
stronger roles for local governments (see Shah 2001).Although a majority
of governments have done some tinkering with their fiscal systems, the
radical change recommended here is not in the cards anywhere. This is
because the unlikelihood of overcoming path dependency—a tall order for
existing institutions and vested interests—makes such reform infeasible.
Under such circumstances, option B may be more workable, but here the
clarity of responsibilities may not be politically feasible.In general,there is
unlikely to be political will to undertake such bold reforms. Piecemeal
adaptation of this model will nevertheless be forced on most countries by
the effects of globalization and by citizen empowerment, facilitated by the
information revolution.
The Practice: Alternative Models of Local Governance and
Central-Local Relations
Local governance historically predates the emergence of nation-states. In
ancient history, tribes and clans established systems of local governance in
most of the world.They established their own codes of conduct and ways of
raising revenues and delivering services to the tribe or clan. Tribal and clan
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members. Some tribes and clans with better organization and skills then
sought to enlarge their spheres of inﬂuence through conquest and coopera-
tion with other tribes. In this way, the ﬁrst Chinese dynasty, the Xia, was
established (2070 BC to 1600 BC) (see Zheng and Fan 2003).A similar situ-
ation prevailed in ancient India, where in the third millennium BC (about
2500 BC) a rich civilization was established in the Indus Valley (now
Pakistan).This advanced civilization placed great emphasis on autonomy in
local governance and enshrined a consensus on division of work for various
members of the society. This emphasis led to the creation of a class society
in which each member had a deﬁned role:upholder of moral values,soldier,
farmer, tradesperson, worker. Each community formed its own consensus
on community services and how to accomplish them.
Native American tribes in North America and tribes and clans in
Western Europe also enjoyed home rule.Subsequent conquests and wars led
to the demise of these harmonious systems of self-rule in local governance
and to the emergence of rule by central governments all over the world.This
development (roughly around 1000 BC in Western Europe) ultimately led
to the creation of unique systems of local governance and central-local
relations in most countries.Those systems can nevertheless be classiﬁed into
the following broad categories for analytical purposes.
The Nordic Model
In the 15th century,Denmark,Norway,and Sweden were ruled by a Danish
king.Residents in those countries contributed to the king’s coffers but were
allowed to run local affairs autonomously (Werner and Shah 2005). In the
absence of central intrusion, the seeds for a locally run, client-oriented,
welfare state were sown.As a result,local governments assumed most func-
tions of the state while the central government largely assumed a ceremonial
role and foreign relations functions. Local governments therefore assumed
responsibility not only for local service delivery but also for social protec-
tion and social welfare functions. Local governments in Nordic countries
serve their residents from cradle to grave.They deliver property-oriented as
well as people-oriented services.
In modern times, the central governments in Nordic countries have
assumed wider regulatory and oversight functions, but the predominance of
local government—more than 30 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)
in Denmark—and its autonomy are still preserved because of citizen satisfac-
tion with local government performance.The Nordic model emphasizes small
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are primarily self-ﬁnancing. In Denmark and Sweden, nearly 75 percent—
and in Norway, 64 percent—of local expenditures are financed from
own-source revenues. Personal income taxes (piggybacking on a national
base) are the mainstays of local ﬁnance (almost 91 percent of tax revenues),
and property taxes contribute a pitiful 7 percent of tax revenues.
The Swiss Model
The origins of the Swiss Confederation can be traced to the defensive
alliance signed by the cantons of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden in 1291.
Before that event, the Swiss territories were under the control of inde-
pendent local governments (cantons). This tradition of local government
domination continues in the Swiss system today: local governments enjoy
autonomy not only in ﬁscal matters but also in such areas as immigration,
citizenship,language,and foreign economic relations.
This tradition of strong local government is further strengthened
through direct democracy provisions in the Swiss constitution,including (a)
people’s initiatives, (b) referenda, and (c) petitions. The people’s initiatives
empower citizens to seek a decision on an amendment that they want to
make to the constitution.A people’s initiative may be formulated as a general
proposal or as a precisely formulated text whose wording can no longer be
changed by parliament or the government. For such an initiative to be
considered, the signatures of 100,000 voters must be collected within 18
months. A popular majority and a majority of all cantons are required for
the acceptance of such an initiative.
Through the referenda provision,the people are entitled to pronounce
their judgments on matters under consideration by the legislature or the
executive or matters on which a decision has already been made.In the lat-
ter case,the referendum acts as a veto.Federal laws and international treaties
are subject to optional referenda, provided that 50,000 citizens request it
within 100 days of the publication of the decree. Under the petition provi-
sion,all eligible voters can submit a petition to the government and are enti-
tled to receive a reply. Switzerland consists of 26 cantons and 2,842
communes.Each canton has its own constitution,parliament,government,
and courts.The communes are handmaidens of the cantons.They perform
some delegated tasks such as population registration and civil defense,
but they have autonomous competencies in education and social welfare,
energy supply, roads, local planning, and local taxation (Government of
Switzerland 2003).
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In the French model, the primary role of local governments is to allow citi-
zens at the grassroots level a sense of political participation in decision mak-
ing at the national level.The system embodies the thinking of Rousseau and
Voltaire on rationality and social cohesion and that of Napoleon on a sense
of order and an unbroken chain of command.The national government and
its agencies represent the apex ofthis system,with an unbroken chain ofcom-
mand through regional and departmental prefects to chief executives and
mayors ofcommunes at the lowest rung ofthe system.There is a similar chain
of command through line and functional ministries.Therefore,the model is
sometimes referred to as the dual supervision model of local governance.
The system permits cumul des mandats (concurrent political mandates
or holding multiple ofﬁces or positions concurrently) to provide elected
leaders at lower echelons with a voice at higher levels of governments.Pub-
lic service delivery remains the primary responsibility of the national gov-
ernment, and its agencies may be directly involved in the delivery of local
services.The average size of local government jurisdiction is small (covering
fewer than 10,000 inhabitants),and local governments have a limited range
of autonomous service delivery responsibilities. Local governments use a
mix of local revenue instruments and rely signiﬁcantly on central ﬁnancing.
This model,with its focus on strong central command and dual supervision,
proved very popular with colonial rulers from France,Portugal,and Spain,
as well as with military dictators, and was widely replicated in developing
countries (Humes 1991).
The German Model
The German model emphasizes subsidiarity,cooperation,and administrative
efﬁciency.It entrusts policy-making functions to the federal level and service
delivery responsibilities to geographically delineated states and local govern-
ments,to which it gives a great deal of autonomy in service delivery.All purely
local services are assigned to local governments.The average local government
covers 20,000 inhabitants,and local expenditures constitute about 10 percent
of GDP.General revenue sharing serves as a major source of local ﬁnances.
The British Model
The British model has elements of the French dual supervision model. It
emphasizes a stronger role for centrally appointed ﬁeld ofﬁcers and sectoral
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ments must coordinate their actions with these ofﬁcials.Local governments
are given substantial autonomy in purely local functions,but they can access
only a limited range of revenue instruments.Local governments play a dom-
inant role in such property-oriented services as road maintenance,garbage
collection, water, and sewerage and a limited role in such people-oriented
services as health,education,and social welfare.Property taxes are the main-
stay of local governments.Local governments typically derive two-thirds of
their revenues from central transfers. They do not have access to personal
income taxes.The role of the chief executive is weak,and local councils play
a strong role in local decision making.The average local government is large,
covering about 120,000 inhabitants, and local expenditures account for
about 12 percent of GDP (McMillan forthcoming). In former British
colonies,the role of ﬁeld ofﬁcers was strengthened to provide general super-
vision and control of local governments on behalf of the central colonial
government.
The Indian Model
India had one of the oldest traditions of strong self-governance at the local
level. In the pre-Moghul period, local government was in operation more
extensively in India than anywhere else in the world. Small villages and
towns were regulated by custom and community leadership,with authority
normally vested in an elders’ council headed by a sarpanch or numberdar.
The apex institution was the panchayat, with responsibilities for law and
order, local services, land management, dispute resolution, administration
of justice, provision of basic needs, and revenue collection. These institu-
tions enabled each village and town to function harmoniously.
Subsequent wars and conquest led to a weakening of local governance in
India.During the Moghul period,panchayats were required to collect central
taxes,but local government autonomy was not disturbed (Wajidi 1990).Dur-
ing the British Raj,with its central focus on command and control and little
concern for service delivery,the system of local governance received a major
setback. Powers were centralized, and loyalty to the British regime was
rewarded with land grants,leading to the creation of a class of feudal aristo-
crats who dominated the local political scene on behalf of the British gov-
ernment.The central government also appointed roving bureaucrats to run
local affairs.Since independence in both India and Pakistan,centralized gov-
ernance has been maintained,while small steps have been taken to strengthen
local autonomy. In India, feudal aristocracy was abolished through land
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in areas of feudal dominance in Pakistan,local self-governance led to capture
by elites.
The Chinese Model
This model places strong emphasis on making provincial and local govern-
ments an integral and dependent sphere of national government. This is
accomplished in two ways:through democratic centralism,which integrates
the local people’s congress with the national People’s Congress through a
system of elections, and through dual subordination of local governments,
whereby provincial and local governments are accountable to higher-level
governments in general, but the functional departments are also account-
able to higher-level functional agencies and departments. The personnel
functions are also integrated among various orders of government.Because
of its integrative nature, the model permits a large and expansive role for
provincial and local governments in service delivery.The average local gov-
ernment jurisdiction is very large. Subprovincial local government expen-
diture constitutes 51.4 percent of consolidated public expenditures.
Subprovincial local governments employ 89 percent of the total government
workforce.Some clearly central functions such as unemployment insurance,
social security,and social safety nets are assigned to provincial and local gov-
ernments. Local autonomy varies directly with the ﬁscal capacity of a local
government, with richer jurisdictions calling their own tunes while poor
jurisdictions follow the pied piper of higher-level governments.
The Japanese Model
The local government system introduced in Meiji Japan in about 1890 had
elements of the French and German models.It emphasized centralized con-
trol, as in the French model of local governments, through the Ministry of
Interior appointing heads of regional governments (governors of prefec-
tures), who controlled local districts and municipalities. The local govern-
ment simply implemented policies determined by the central government.
In the post–World War II period,direct elections of governors,mayors,and
councils were introduced. The practice of agency delegation (German
model) was retained,and local governments were expected to perform func-
tions mandated by the central government and its agencies.The Ministry of
Home Affairs,which had a supportive role for local governments,was intro-
duced in 1960 (Muramatsu and Iqbal 2001).Income taxes are the mainstay
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revenues, followed by property taxes (about 30 percent) and sales taxes
(about 10 percent).
The North American Model
In the early period of North American history,local communities functioned
as civic republics (Kincaid 1967) governed by mutual consent of their mem-
bers.The framers ofthe U.S.constitution did not recognize local governments.
The Civil War led to the centralization of powers in the United States.Subse-
quently,the formal institutions oflocal government were created by states.The
judiciary further constrained the role of local government through recogni-
tion of Dillon’s rule:local governments may exercise only those powers explic-
itly granted to them under state legislation. Subsequently, most states have
attempted to grant autonomy to local governments in discharging their spec-
iﬁed functions through home rule provisions (Bowman and Kearney 1990).
Local governments in Canada are faced with circumstances similar to
those in the United States.Thus,the North American model recognizes local
government as a handmaiden of states and provinces but attempts to grant
autonomy (home rule) to local governments in their speciﬁc areas of
responsibility—predominantly delivery of property-oriented services.Local
governments perform an intermediate range of functions.The average juris-
diction of local government in the United States is about 10,000 and in
Canada about 6,000 inhabitants.Property taxes are the dominant source of
local revenues.Local government expenditures constitute about 7 percent of
GDP (see McMillan forthcoming).
The Australian Model
The Australian constitution does not recognize local governments. It is left
to the states to decide on a system of local governance in their territories.
Most states have assigned a minimal set of functions to local governments,
including engineering services (roads, bridges, sidewalks, and drainage);
community services (old-age care,child care,ﬁre protection);environmen-
tal services (waste management and environmental protection); regulatory
services (zoning, dwellings, buildings, restaurants, animals); and cultural
services (libraries, art galleries, museums). Local governments raise only 3
percent of national revenues and are responsible for 6 percent of consoli-
dated public sector expenditures.Property taxes (rates) and user charges are
the mainstay (about 70 percent) of revenues, and central and state grants
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amenities,and recreation and culture command two-thirds of local expen-
ditures.Local government in New Zealand bears a close resemblance to the
Australian model.
A Comparative Overview of Local Government Organization
and Finance in Selected Developing Countries
The conceptual literature argues for a strong role of local governments in
local development, thereby improving public services and quality of life at
the local level. It would therefore be instructive to learn about the role of
such governments in developing countries. The following paragraphs pro-
vide a bird’s-eye view of local government organization and ﬁnance in 10
selected developing countries.
Legal Status of Local Governments
The legal status of local governments varies across developing countries.In
Brazil,Chile,India,South Africa,and Uganda,local governments have a con-
stitutional status.In Indonesia,Kazakhstan,and Poland,local governments
were created by national legislation, in Argentina by provincial legislation,
and in China by an executive order of the central government.It is interest-
ing to note that there is no clear pattern in the autonomy and range of local
services provided by local governments deriving their status from national
and state constitutions or legislation. However, local governments that are
created through legislation, in general, are signiﬁcantly weaker—with the
notable exception of Poland.
Relative Importance of Local Governments
The relative importance of local governments in developing countries is
compared using two indicators: share of consolidated public sector
expenditures (figure 1.1) and local expenditures as a percentage of GDP
(figure 1.2). According to both criteria, local governments in China com-
mand the largest share—more than 51 percent of consolidated public
expenditures and 10.8 percent of GDP—whereas in India, it is the smallest
share—3 percent of the expenditures and 0.75 percent of GDP. The rank
order of some countries,however,is not consistent across both criteria.For
example, South Africa does better than Brazil on the ﬁrst and worse on
the second criterion. On average in sample countries, local government
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tures and 5.7 percent of national GDP. Comparable ﬁgures for a sample of
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries would be 28 percent of consolidated expenditures and 12.75 percent of
GDP.Thus,local governments’role is large,but in comparison with central
and intermediate governments in developing countries and local govern-
ments in OECD countries, it is relatively much smaller in most developing
countries—with the exception of China and Poland. In China, subprovin-
cial local governments employ 38.7 million people and account for 89 per-
cent of total public employment.
Population Size Covered by Local Governments
There are wide variations in the number and median size of municipal
governments in the sample countries. Uganda has only 70 municipal
governments, whereas China has 43,965 (table 1.6). The mean population
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FIGURE 1.1 A Comparative Perspective on Local Government Share
of Consolidated Public Expenditurescovered by municipal government is fewer than 10,000 people in Indonesia
and Kazakhstan and more than 100,000 people in China,South Africa,and
Uganda.Argentina and Poland have mean populations of less than 20,000,
and Brazil has a mean municipal government population of about 31,000.
Municipal governments in Chile and India have mean populations between
60,000 and 70,000 (table 1.7).
Local Spending Responsibilities
Local governments vary in their responsibilities across developing countries.
China grants most extensive expenditure responsibilities to local governments.
In addition to traditional local and municipal services, local governments in
China are responsible for social security (primarily pensions and unemployment
allowances) and have a much larger role in local economic development than
local governments in other countries.Local governments’role indelivering local
services is minimal in India and South Africa and largely focused on delivery
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FIGURE 1.2 Local Expenditures as a Share of National GDP3
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TABLE 1.6 Size Distribution of Municipal Governments in Developing Countries
Number of Argentina Brazil Chile  China  India  Indonesia  Kazakhstan   Poland  South Africa  Uganda 
inhabitants (2001) (2002) (1992) (2004) (2001) (1990) (2002) (2003) (2001) (2002)
0–4,999 1,770 1,365 269 43,258 230,161 1,237 7,660 604 0 0
5,000–9,999 1,316 16 16,115 62 201 1,049 4 1
10,000–19,999 360 1,342 40 5,536 81 731 16 0
20,000–24,999 989 7 0
25,000–49,999 24 1,386 7 36 6
50,000–99,999 309 498 7 54 61 6
100,000–199,999 123 388 6 18 22 67 9
200,000–499,999 82 374 13 52 31
500,000–999,999 20 283 5 25 15
1,000,000 or more 14 50 35 1 14 2
Total number of municipalities 2,154 5,560 325 43,965 254,119 1,312 7,968 2,478 282 70
Source: Chapters 2–11 (this volume); Werner forthcoming. 
Note: An arrow indicates that the value is an aggregate and covers the range indicated.of municipal services.In Kazakhstan,all local services are shared central-local
responsibilities;local governments do not have independent budgets and have
no ﬁscal autonomy.Education and health account for nearly half of local gov-
ernment expenditures in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Kazakhstan,
Poland, and Uganda. In Uganda, education alone accounts for about 40 per-
cent of local expenditures.In India and South Africa,municipal services (such
as water, sewer, and garbage) and municipal administration dominate local
expenditures. In China, education, municipal administration, justice, and
police account for nearly half of local expenditures.
Local Revenues and Revenue Autonomy
Local governments in sample countries raise 39.6 percent of revenues
from taxes, another 9.5 percent from fees and charges, and the remaining
50.9 percent from higher-level transfers (ﬁgure 1.3 and table 1.8).Compara-
ble ﬁgures for OECD countries are 49 percent for taxes,16.6 percent for fees,
and 34.4 percent for transfers.The role of ﬁscal transfers is much larger than
average in Uganda (85.4 percent), Poland (76.0 percent), China (67.0 per-
cent),Brazil (65.4 percent),and Indonesia (62.0 percent).The sample coun-
tries have diverse revenue structures.On average,they raise 32 percent of tax
revenues from property taxes,15 percent of revenues from personal income
taxes,4 percent from corporate income taxes,and the other 49 percent from
a large number ofsmall taxes,fees,and charges.In comparison,OECD coun-
tries raise 54 percent of local revenues from property taxes,23 percent from
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TABLE 1.7 Average Population per Local Authority in Sample 
Developing Countries
Country Average population per local authority 
India, rural 3,278
Kazakhstan 4,331
Indonesia 5,915
Argentina 14,972
Poland 18,881
Brazil 30,099
Chile 64,592
India, urban 68,027
China 107,334
South Africa 238,839
Uganda 373,321
All sample countries 79,000
Source: Table 1.6 (this volume).38 Anwar Shah with Sana Shah
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FIGURE 1.3 Composition of Operating Revenues for Local Authorities
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
property tax personal income tax corporate income tax other taxes
India
Indonesia
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
China
Kazakhstan
Poland
South Africa
Uganda
average
OECD average
Source: Calculations based on World Development Indicators Online; government ﬁnance statistics; chapters
2–11 (this volume); Naresh 2004; Werner forthcoming.
Note: The data are the latest available for each country—1997, Poland; 2000, India: 2001, Chile, Indonesia,
and South Africa; and 2003, Argentina, Brazil, China, Kazakhstan, and Uganda.
FIGURE 1.4 Composition of Local Tax Revenuespersonal income taxes,14 percent from corporate taxes,and 9 percent from
other taxes.Thus,local governments place a much greater reliance on prop-
erty and income taxes in OECD countries than in developing countries.
Property taxes raise only 3 percent of local revenues in China and 74 percent
in Indonesia (centrally administered property tax) (ﬁgure 1.4).
For all developing countries,revenues from property taxes amount to 0.5
percent of GDP compared with about 2 percent (1 to 3 percent) of GDP in
industrial countries.This ﬁnding suggests that property taxes may represent
signiﬁcant untapped potential for further exploitation. User charges are a
signiﬁcant source ofrevenues,but often such charges are poorly designed and
administered and do not satisfy equity and efﬁciency principles or provide
special safeguards for the poor. Autonomy in local tax base determination
and administration is signiﬁcant in Argentina,Brazil,and Poland; is limited
in other countries; and does not exist in Kazakhstan. Overall, the degree of
tax centralization in the sample countries is far greater than would be dictated
by economic principles or political accountability considerations.
Sample countries in general follow a formula-based approach to general-
purpose transfers. Nevertheless, the transfers are often not well designed
compared with principles and better practices laid out in table 1.4. China,
Indonesia,Poland,and South Africa attempt to use ﬁscal capacity and ﬁscal
need measures in their ﬁscal equalization transfers, whereas most other
countries have revenue-sharing programs with multiple factors that work at
cross-purposes. The practice of ﬁscal equalization transfers is welcome;
however, none of the sample countries use explicit equalization standards
that determine both the total pool and the allocation of these transfers.As a
result,the transfers do not achieve jurisdictional ﬁscal equity goals.Speciﬁc-
purpose transfers are usually ad hoc and do not create incentives to safeguard
The New Vision of Local Governance 39
TABLE 1.8 Intergovernmental Transfers as a Share of Local
Government Revenues in Developing Countries, 2003 
Transfers as a percentage  Countries (listed in ascending 
of total local revenues order of the share of transfers)
10–20 South Africa
20–30 Kazakhstan, Chile
30–40 India 
40–50 Argentina 
60–70 Indonesia, Brazil, China
70–80 Poland, Uganda
Source: Chapters 2–11 (this volume). 
Note: There were no countries with percentages in the 50–60 range.their objectives.In particular,none of the sample countries practice output-
based ﬁscal transfers to set national minimum standards of basic services
and to enhance local accountability to citizens for results or performance.
Thus, the reform of ﬁscal transfers to ensure equitable and accountable
governance remains an unﬁnished task.
Facilitating Local Access to Credit
Local borrowing from capital markets is permitted in most of the sample
countries with the exception of China,Chile,and Indonesia.In China,how-
ever,central government may borrow or issue bonds on behalf of local gov-
ernments, and local enterprises owned by local governments can also
borrow directly from the capital markets. In Argentina, Brazil, and Poland,
local borrowing from domestic and international capital markets is allowed
but constrained by ﬁscal rules, to ensure ﬁscal prudence and debt sustain-
ability. In South Africa most such borrowing takes place from public agen-
cies such as the Infrastructure Finance Corporation and the Development
Bank of Southern Africa. The central government in South Africa provides
regulatory oversight of all such borrowing and has the authority to intervene
if a local government fails to meet its debt servicing obligations.South Africa
has enacted a comprehensive framework for ﬁscal prudence at the local level,
including provisions for declaring bankruptcy.In Kazakhstan,local govern-
ments can borrow only from the central government.
Large infrastructure deﬁciencies in developing countries call for signif-
icant access to borrowing by local governments. But local access to credit
requires well-functioning ﬁnancial markets and creditworthy local govern-
ments. In developing countries, undeveloped markets for long-term credit
and weak municipal creditworthiness limit municipal access to credit.
Nevertheless, the predominant central government policy emphasis is on
central controls.Consequently,less attention has been paid to assistance for
borrowing. In a few countries, such assistance is available through special-
ized institutions and central guarantees to jump-start municipal access to
credit. These institutions are typically quite fragile, not likely to be sustain-
able, and open to political inﬂuences. Interest rate subsidies provided
through these institutions impede emerging capital market alternatives.
Furthermore, these institutions fail to smooth the transition to a market-
based capital ﬁnance system.
Thus, in developing countries, the menu of choices available to local
governments for ﬁnancing capital projects is quite limited,and the available
alternatives are not conducive to developing a sustainable institutional
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nomic instability and lack of ﬁscal discipline and appropriate regulatory
regimes have impeded the development of ﬁnancial and capital markets.In
addition,revenue capacity at the local level is limited because of tax central-
ization.A ﬁrst transitory step to provide limited credit market access to local
governments may be to establish municipal ﬁnance corporations run on
commercial principles and to encourage the development of municipal rat-
ing agencies to assist in such borrowing.Tax decentralization is also impor-
tant to establish private sector conﬁdence in lending to local governments
and sharing in the risks and rewards of such lending. Central government
bailouts and guarantee of subnational debt should, however, be ruled out
through enactment of comprehensive frameworks of ﬁscal responsibility
and ﬁscal insolvency,as was done in Brazil and South Africa recently.Trans-
parency in local budgeting and independent credit rating agencies are also
essential to smooth the transition to a market-based approach to subna-
tional lending.
Some Conclusions about Local Governance in Developing Countries 
Recent years have seen positive developments regarding local governance in
developing countries. Local governments are increasingly assuming a larger
role in public services delivery. However, with the exception of a handful of
countries such as Brazil,China,and Poland,local governments continue to play
a very small role in people’s lives.They typically are bounded by the principle
ofultra vires and allowed to discharge only a small number offunctions,which
are mandated from above. They have limited autonomy in expenditure deci-
sions and hardly any in revenue-raising decisions.Their access to own-source
revenues is constrained to a few nonproductive bases.Political and bureaucratic
leaders at the local level show little interest in lobbying for more taxing powers
and instead devote all their energies to seeking higher levels of ﬁscal transfers.
As a result, tax decentralization has not kept pace with political and
expenditure decentralization. Hence, one does not ﬁnd many examples of
tax-base sharing, and even the limited existing bases available to local
governments are typically underexploited.Fiscal transfers typically account
for 60 percent of revenues in developing countries (51 percent in sample
developing countries) as opposed to only 34 percent in OECD countries.
This distinct separation of taxing and spending decisions undermines
accountability to local citizens because local leaders do not have to justify
local spending decisions to their electorates.
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and accountability. Although most countries have opted for formula-driven
ﬁscal transfers,the design ofthese transfers remains ﬂawed.They do not create
any incentive for setting national minimum standards or accountability for
results and typically do not serve regional ﬁscal equity objectives either.
Local governments also typically have very limited autonomy in hiring
and ﬁring local government employees. In a number of countries with
decentralization,such as Indonesia and Pakistan,higher government employ-
ees are simply transferred to local levels;ﬁnancing is then provided to cover
their wage costs. This approach limits budgetary ﬂexibility and opportuni-
ties for efﬁcient resource allocation at the local level.
Overall,local governments in developing countries typically follow the
old model of local governance and simply provide a narrow range of local
services directly. The new vision, with the local governments assuming a
network facilitator role to enrich the quality of life of local residents,as dis-
cussed earlier in this chapter,is yet to be realized in any developing country.
Concluding Remarks 
We have presented a brief overview of the conceptual and institutional lit-
erature on local governance.A synthesis of the conceptual literature suggests
that the modern role of a local government is to deal with market failures as
well as government failures.This role requires a local government to operate
as a purchaser of local services, a facilitator of networks of government
providers and entities beyond government,and a gatekeeper and overseer of
state and national governments in areas of shared rule. Local government
also needs to play a mediator’s role among various entities and networks to
foster greater synergy and harness the untapped energies of the broader
community for improving the quality of life of residents.Globalization and
the information revolution are reinforcing those conceptual perspectives on
a catalytic role for local governments.
This view is also grounded in the history of industrial nations and
ancient civilizations in China and India.Local government was the primary
form of government until wars and conquest led to the transfer of local
government responsibilities to central and regional governments.This trend
continued unabated until globalization and the information revolution
highlighted the weaknesses of centralized rule for improving the quality of
life and social outcomes. The new vision of local governance (table 1.9)
presented here argues for a leadership role by local governments in a multi-
centered, multiorder, or multilevel system. This view is critical to creating
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TABLE 1.9 Role of a Local Government under the New Vision of
Local Governance 
20th century: Old view 21st century: New view
Is based on residuality and local  Is based on subsidiarity and home rule
governments as wards of the state
Is based on principle of ultra vires Is based on community governance
Is focused on government Is focused on citizen-centered local
governance
Is agent of the central government Is the primary agent for the citizens and
leader and gatekeeper for shared rule
Is responsive and accountable to  Is responsive and accountable to local
higher-level governments voters; assumes leadership role in
improving local governance 
Is direct provider of local services Is purchaser of local services
Is focused on in-house provision Is facilitator of network mechanisms of
local governance, coordinator of
government providers and entities
beyond government, mediator of
conﬂicts, and developer of social capital
Is focused on secrecy Is focused on letting the sunshine in;
practices transparent governance 
Has input controls Recognizes that results matter
Is internally dependent Is externally focused and competitive; is
ardent practitioner of alternative
service delivery framework
Is closed and slow Is open, quick, and ﬂexible
Has intolerance for risk Is innovative; is risk taker within limits
Depends on central directives Is autonomous in taxing, spending,
regulatory, and administrative decisions
Is rules driven  Has managerial ﬂexibility and accounta-
bility for results
Is bureaucratic and technocratic Is participatory; works to strengthen
citizen voice and exit options through
direct democracy provisions, citizens’
charters, and performance budgeting
Is coercive  Is focused on earning trust, creating
space for civic dialogue, serving the
citizens, and improving social outcomes
Is ﬁscally irresponsible Is ﬁscally prudent; works better and costs less
Is exclusive with elite capture Is inclusive and participatory
Overcomes market failures Overcomes market and government failures
Is boxed in a centralized system  Is connected in a globalized and localized
world
Source: Author.and sustaining citizen-centered governance, in which citizens are the
ultimate sovereigns and various orders of governments serve as agents in the
supply of public governance.In developing countries,such citizen empow-
erment may be the only way to reform public sector governance when
governments are either unwilling or unable to reform themselves.
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